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RAISING THE BAR: NEW WAVE OF CLIMATE
TORT LITIGATION BLOCKS STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS SEEKING RELIEF FROM
EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
IN FEDERAL COURT
I.

INTRODUCTION

As the effects of climate change have become more pronounced and
severe, many local governments have increasingly turned to the federal
judiciary to seek injunctive relief and monetary damages from both
greenhouse gas emitters and producers. Thus far, in climate change tort
litigation suits, justiciability, displacement by the Clean Air Act, standing,
and the political question doctrine have emerged as the primary hurdles for
state and local governments and private citizens seeking relief in federal
court.2 Federal courts maintain a higher bar for standing than most state
courts .' Three recent federal court decisions have effectively shut the door
to plaintiffs seeking relief for greenhouse gas emissions .4 While these
decisions are unfortunate because they eliminated the federal court system
as an avenue for redressing climate change torts, they ultimately came to the
correct legal conclusions.' The decisions accurately applied the federal

1 See City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466,470 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (setting forth
city's claims concerning significant effects of climate change on public health and property); City
of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1021-22 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (demonstrating trend of
state and local governments turning to judiciary for relief); County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp.,
294 F. Supp. 3d 934,937 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (explaining effect of federal common law on plaintiff's
claims for injunctive and monetary relief).
2 See Keith Goldberg, Novel Ruling Redraws Battle Lines of Climate Change Suits, LAW360
(Mar. 1, 2018, 9:01 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/1017385/novel-ruling-redraws-battlelines-of-climate-change-suits [https://perma.cc/76F3-R78W] (describing hurdles plaintiffs face in
climate tort litigation suits).
3 See Goldberg, supra note 2 ("[F]ederal court[s] ... ha[ve] a higher bar for establishing
standing than state courts.").
4 See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 467 (emphasizing political question doctrine bars
adjudication and Clean Air Act displaces action regardless); City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at
1026 (stating political question doctrine bars justiciability); County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d
at 937 (reiterating that plaintiffs' cause of action is displaced). But see California v. BP P.L.C., No.
C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) (holding
plaintiffs' claims were not displaced by Clean Air Act).
5 See cases cited supra note 4 (assessing lower court decisions' legal reasoning).
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common law displacement analysis and avoided interbranch conflict
between the federal judiciary and the executive and legislative branches .6
In California v. BP PJL.C., the court's preliminary order injected
new uncertainty into climate tort litigation by stating that the global warming
liability of several fossil fuel producers was a question of federal law.' In
his preliminary order, Judge William Alsup, of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, stated that San Francisco and
Oakland's claim that several fossil fuel producers promoted fossil fuel use
justified federal jurisdiction, even though they knew global warming could
harm coastal areas.8 However, in his final ruling, Judge Alsup changed his
view by stating that the issue of global warming should be left to the other
branches of government to resolve.' In City of New York and County of San
Mateo, the courts found that -even though the Clean Air Act still displaced
the plaintiffs' claims-the political question doctrine made the suits
nonjusticiable. 10
In 2011, the Supreme Court held in American Electric Power that
the Clean Air Act displaced the plaintiffs claims for damages caused by
global warming, and consequently set aside the question of whether the
plaintiffs had Article 11 standing (as established in Massachusettsv. EPA).' I
Following the American Electric Power decision, several questions, such as
whether state and local governments have standing to sue greenhouse gas
producers and whether the political question doctrine made the plaintiffs'
claims non-justiciable, were placed on the backburner until cities developed
a theory to bypass displacement. 2 Believing they had a new legal theory
6 See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 278 (8th ed.
2018) (explaining court's reasoning for dismissing plaintiffs' complaint in City of Oakland).
7 See California,2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at *14 (noting Clean Air Act does not address
fossil fuels placed into flow of commerce); Goldberg, supra note 2 (stating energy producers'
liability is question of federal law).
8 See California, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at *15 ("But plaintiffs' claims, if any, are
governed by federal common law. Federal jurisdiction is therefore proper."); Goldberg, supra note
2 (emphasizing implications of California decision).
9 See City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1029 ("The problem deserves a solution on a more
vast scale than can be supplied by a district judge or jury in a public nuisance case ... courts must
also respect and defer to the other co-equal branches of government when the problem at hand
clearly deserves a solution best addressed by those branches.").
10 See City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 472-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(explaining how political question doctrine barred and displaced plaintiff's action); County of San
Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (holding "federal common
law does not govern" plaintiffs' claims).
11 See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410,424 (2011) (noting Clean Air Act
"speaks directly" to emissions from coal plants); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517-26
(2007) (stating that petitioners satisfied Article II standing requirement).
12 See Ferrey, supra note 6 (explaining how justiciability questions were sidelined).
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that would allow federal courts to find oil companies liable for adversely
contributing to climate change, Oakland, New York City, and the County of
San Mateo filed complaints in numerous federal district courts seeking
relief.13
Judge Alsup's preliminary order in Californiafound that the Clean
Air Act did not displace the plaintiff's common law nuisance claim; this
temporarily removed the Clean Air Act as a hurdle for the plaintiffs suing
energy producers in federal court.' 4 This raised the question of whether the
court, in its final ruling, would address other justiciability concerns-such
as the political question doctrine and standing- since the case had ostensibly
survived displacement. 5 However, Judge Alsup's final ruling in City of
Oakland largely sidestepped the displacement question and held that global
warming should be addressed by the other branches of government. 6
This Note analyzes the implications of these recent federal court
rulings, the initial uncertainty that existed in the wake of American Electric
Power and Kivalina, and how City of Oakland, County of San Mateo, and
City of New York dealt a devastating blow to climate advocates hoping for
redress in the federal court system. 1 Furthermore, this Note explores how
displacement, standing, and the political question doctrine are three major
hurdles plaintiffs face in their efforts to get federal courts to adjudicate their
complaints. 8 Finally, this Note not only argues that the lower courts
correctly interpreted existing precedent and regulations by finding that suits
brought by cities against energy producers are displaced, but also that global
warming and its consequences are issues best left to the other branches of
government to resolve. 19

13

See Goldberg, supra note 2 (elucidating new theory presented in recent climate change tort

litigation).
14 See California, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at *13-14 (explaining rationale for court's
preliminary order). The court's holding is limited to the Ninth Circuit. Id.
15 See Goldberg, supra note 2 (describing questions raised by federal ruling).
16 See City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (explaining
why judicial deference is appropriate in climate litigation).
17 See California,2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at *13 ("[U]nlike AEP and Kivalina, which
sought only to reach domestic conduct, plaintiffs' claims here attack behavior worldwide."). The
California case refers to the district court's preliminary order. Ferrey, supra note 6. In Judge
Alsup's final ruling, the case name was changed to City of Oakland, but they are the same cases.
Ferrey, supra note 6.
18 See Michael Byers et al., The Internationalizationof Climate DamagesLitigation,7 WASH.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 264, 272 (2017) (introducing threshold issues facing recent climate
litigation).
19 See City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466,472-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (rejecting
New York's claim that Clean Air Act displaces sale and production of fossil fuels); City of Oakland,
325 F. Supp. 3d at 1024-29 (demonstrating correct interpretation of existing precedent); County of
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II. HISTORY
Federal courts only have jurisdiction over "cases and
controversies ."2° In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court identified the
three prudential standing elements as the following: a personal injury that is
concrete and imminent, an injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant, and
that a favorable decision will likely redress the injury.2 ' In EPA, the Supreme
Court held that Massachusetts had standing to sue the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to set emission standards for motor vehicles. 2
The Court found there was an actual and imminent personal injury to
Massachusetts by reasoning that rising sea levels had already begun to flood
the state's coastal land.23 Since Massachusetts owned a large portion of the
state's coastal property, the Court held that the Commonwealth developed a
particularized injury in its status as a landowner. 24 Additionally, the Court
reasoned that the adverse effects of climate change would continually
contribute to the severity of the Commonwealth's injury .25 The Court also
held that U.S. motor vehicle emissions not only significantly contributed to
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, but were also partially responsible for the

San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934,937 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (holding plaintiffs' claims
based on defendants' conduct did not warrant federal court review).
20 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (presenting requirements for standing). Article III states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;-all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;
-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different Statesbetween Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
21 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (describing three
prudential elements plaintiff must satisfy to have standing).
22 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007) (presenting Court's holding that
Massachusetts had standing to sue).
23 See id. at 522-24 (noting Court's holding and reasoning). In other words, EPA argued that
establishing emissions standards would only reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions, and not
eliminate them domestically or internationally. Id. The court rejected the EPA's argument that
their failure to regulate did not cause the plaintiff's injury. Id.
24 See id. at 522 (analyzing particularized injury in Massachusetts).
25 See id. at 522-23 (emphasizing how climate change would continue to exacerbate plaintiffs
injury).
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26
adverse effects of climate change for which the plaintiff sought relief. In
finding that the causation element of Article III standing was satisfied, the
Court rejected the EPA's argument that incremental regulatory action is
27 The Court held that
insufficient to meet the causation requirement.
Massachusetts met the redressability element, reasoning that regulating
motor vehicle emissions in the United States would reduce domestic
greenhouse gas emissions is sufficient, and that completely eliminating
28
greenhouse gas emissions was not necessary.
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut ("AEP") established
the framework for evaluating whether the Clean Air Act displaces the
plaintiffs common law nuisance claims for abatement of emissions .29 The
test for whether congressional legislation precludes a federal common law
30
claim is whether the statute "speaks directly to the question" at issue. In
AEP, the Court held that the Clean Air Act displaced common law nuisance
claims for damages caused by global warming; it also reasoned that
Congress' delegation to the EPA to decide whether and how to regulate
carbon-dioxide emissions displaced a federal common law claim for
damages.31 In other words, the Court believed that the EPA served as the
appropriate body to hold state, local, and the federal government liable for

See EPA, 549 U.S. at 523-24 ("Judged by any standard, U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make
a meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, according to petitioners, to
global warming.").
27 See id. at 499 ("That a first step might be tentative does not by itself negate federal-court
26

jurisdiction.").
28 See id. at 525-26 ("Nor is it dispositive that developing countries such as China and India
are poised to increase greenhouse gas emissions substantially over the next century: A reduction in
domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens
elsewhere.").
29 See generally American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011)
(introducing test for whether congressional legislation excludes federal common law).
30 See id. at 424 ("The test for whether congressional legislation excludes the declaration of
federal common law is simply whether the statute 'speak[s] directly to [the] question' at issue.").
The question is "whether Congress has provided a sufficient legislative solution to the particular
issue to warrant a conclusion that the legislation has occupied the field to the exclusion of federal
common law." Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2012)
(restating displacement test), quoting Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 667 F.3d 765, 777
(7th Cir. 2011) (declining to assert jurisdiction over claims Supreme Court has yet to consider).
31 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 427 (discussing Court's holding and reasoning). "If
States (or EPA) fail to enforce emissions limits against regulated sources, the Act permits 'any
person' to bring a civil enforcement action in federal court." Id. at 425. In other words, the EPA
provides a means to seek limits on domestic powerplants' carbon dioxide emissions. Id. As this
was the same relief that the plaintiffs in AEP sought, their claims were ultimately displaced by the
Clean Air Act. Id.

2020]

NEW WAVE OF CLIMATE TORT LITIGATION

violating emissions standards.3 2 The EPA has the power to "inspect and
monitor regulated sources of carbon dioxide emissions, to impose
administrative penalties for non-compliance, and to commence civil actions
against polluters in federal court."33
Additionally, the Clean Air Act permits any person to bring a civil
enforcement action in federal court if either the EPA or the States "fail to
enforce emissions limits against regulated sources."34 More importantly, not
only can States and private parties petition the EPA to set emissions limits
for a particular pollutant or source of pollution - if there are none already but the EPA's decision is also reviewable in federal court.35 Thus, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Clean Air Act provided a way to seek
limits on carbon dioxide emissions from domestic powerplants -the precise
relief the plaintiffs sought through federal common law .36 In addition to
displacing claims for enjoining emissions, the Ninth Circuit held in Native
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., that the Clean Air Act also
displaced federal common law nuisance claims for damages caused by
global warming.3 7 In Kivalina, the Native Village of Kivalina alleged that
the greenhouse gas emissions emitted by numerous energy producers
contributed to global warming and severely deteriorated the tribe's land. 8
As a result, Native Village of Kivalina members believed that the energy
producers should pay damages to them.39 The Ninth Circuit held that if a

32 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2018) ("The Administrator shall have the same authority ...to
enforce the provisions of such plan in cases where the State fails to enforce them as he would
have. . . with respect to an implementation plan."); EPA, 549 U.S. at 526 (identifying that EPA
serves as accountability mechanism for climate related injuries).
"3 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(c)(2), d(2), 7413, 7414 (2018) (stating federal statutes which give
authority to administrators, such as EPA); Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 425 (discussing
Supreme Court's application of federal statutes giving power to EPA).
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2018) (permitting "any person" to bring civil
action against
governmental agencies or Administrators); Am. Elec. PowerCo., 564 U.S. at 425 (describing how
climate change cases are not necessarily immune from judicial review).
35 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 425 (explaining process to hold EPA accountable).
36 See id. (noting Clean Air Act provided remedy for plaintiffs' injuries).
37 See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849,858 (9th Cir. 2012) ("In
sum, the Supreme Court has held that federal common law addressing domestic greenhouse gas
emissions has been displaced by Congressional action. That determination displaces federal
common law public nuisance actions seeking damages, as well as those actions seeking injunctive
relief.").
38 See id. at 853 ("Kivalina alleges that massive greenhouse gas emissions emitted by the
Energy Producers have resulted in global warming, which, in turn, has severely eroded the land
where the City of Kivalina sits and threatens it with imminent destruction.").
39 See id. ("Kivalina seeks damages under a federal common law claim of public nuisance.").
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4
0
cause of action is displaced, displacement is extended to all remedies.
Consequently, the court concluded that, regardless of the desired remedy, the
a cause of action that centered on domestic
Clean Air Act still displaced
4
greenhouse gas emissions. 1
The political question doctrine is another traditional obstacle to
climate suit cases .42 The political question doctrine is a separation of powers
issue and is "designed to restrain the Judiciary from inappropriate
' 43
As a
interference in the business of the other branches of Government.
Court
the
In
Baker,
result, political questions are deemed "nonjusticiable."44
45
set out six situations in which something may describe a political question.
Additionally, Baker established a high threshold for non-justiciability,
stating that "[u]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case
at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a
political question's presence."' In Am. Elec. Power Co., the Second Circuit

found no textual commitment in the Constitution that granted authority to
the Executive or Legislative Branches to resolve issues concerning carbon
40 See id. at 857 ("[D]isplacement of a federal common law right of action means displacement
of remedies.").
41 See Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857 ("Thus, AEP extinguished Kivalina's federal common law
public nuisance damage action, along with the federal common law public nuisance abatement
actions.").
42 See Goldberg, supra note 2 (noting political question doctrine may be relevant if
displacement issue satisfied in climate cases).
43 See Baker v. Cart, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ( "The nonjusticiability of a political question
is primarily a function of the separation of powers."); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582
F.3d 309, 321 (2d Cir. 2009) ("The political question doctrine is 'primarily a function of the
separation of powers ... designed to restrain the Judiciary from inappropriate interference in the
business of the other branches of Government,' where that other branch is better suited to resolve
an issue.") (internal citations omitted).
44 See Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008) (Political questions are
"unjusticiable" when there is "an undeniable difference between finding no federal jurisdiction at
the outset of a case and declaring that a particular matter is inappropriate for judicial resolution
only after some consideration of the merits.").
45 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (explaining test that determines whether something is political
question). Something is a non-justiciable political question if:

[(1)] [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
46 See id. at 217 (indicating high bar for non-justiciability based on political question doctrine).
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dioxide emissions and concluded that the first Baker factor did not apply. 47
The court also found that the second Baker factor did not apply because
settled principles of tort and public nuisance law already provide the court
guidance in assessing the plaintiffs' claims .48 Addressing the third Baker
factor the court held that the plaintiffs did not need to await an initial policy
determination in order to proceed on their federal common law nuisance
claim since courts have the power to act when regulatory gaps exist. 49 The
court also held that the fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker factors did not apply
because there is no unified U.S. policy on greenhouse gas emissions.5°
The Second and Ninth Circuit Courts are the only circuits that
addressed the issue of Article Il standing in climate suits." In AEP, the
Supreme Court was divided on the issue of whether the plaintiffs had Article
III standing under EPA to sue the power plants. 2 While four of the justices
held that the plaintiffs had standing, four held that the plaintiffs did not. 3 As
a result, the Second Circuit's ruling that the plaintiffs had standing was
upheld." In holding that the plaintiffs had Article III standing to sue the
domestic power plants, the Second Circuit addressed each element of
prudential standing.55 First, the court held that the plaintiffs showed injury
in fact because of the injuries that they already sustained and would continue

47 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309,325 (2d Cir. 2009) (explaining why
first Baker factor did not apply). When AEP later reached the Supreme Court, the Court was split
on whether the plaintiffs had Article HI standing. See Am. Elec. Power. Co. v. Connecticut, 564
U.S. 410, 420 (2011). The Court, nonetheless, held that the plaintiffs' claims were displaced by
the Clean Air Act. Id. at 424.
48 See Am. Elec. Power. Co., 582 F.3d at 329 ("Accordingly, we do not agree that there are no
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving this case. Well-settled principals of
tort and public nuisance law provide appropriate guidance to the district court in assessing
Plaintiffs' claims and the federal courts are competent to deal with these issues.").
49 See id. at 330 ("The district court's reasoning in this regard is inapposite in a case making a
federal common law of nuisance claim where, if regulatory gaps exist, common law fills those
interstices.").
'0 See id. at 331-32 ("[T]here really is no unified policy on greenhouse gas emissions.
Allowing this litigation where there is a lack of a unified policy does not demonstrate any lack of
respect for the political branches, contravene a relevant political decision already made, or result in
multifarious pronouncements that would embarrass the nation.").
51 See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining
standing in climate suits); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 321 (2d Cir. 2009)
(discussing Article I standing and political question doctrine in climate suits).
52 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 420 (acknowledging decision involved "equally
divided court" on whether plaintiffs had standing).
53 See id. at 420 (highlighting result of Court's holding and schism between justices).
54 See Goldberg, supra note 2 (describing effect of Court's split decision in AEP).
55 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309,339-49 (2d Cir. 2009) (introducing
Second Circuit's standing analysis and rationale).
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to face in the future, such as rising sea levels.56 Second, the court held that
the plaintiffs satisfied the causation requirement because the defendant's
emissions contributed to their injuries."7 Finally, the court held that the
plaintiffs satisfied the redressability requirement, reasoning that reducing the
defendant's emissions would slow increases in global emissions and reduce
the magnitude of the plaintiffs' injuries.58 As a result, the court held that the
plaintiffs would be better off with a remedy.59 The court stressed that the
proposed remedy need not address or prevent all harm from a variety of other
sources 60
When analyzing whether a plaintiff has Article I standing, courts
generally impose a higher burden of proof on private individuals than they
do on sovereign states.6 1 In Bellon, the Ninth Circuit held that conservation
groups did not have Article III standing to sue Washington state
environmental agencies under the Clean Air Act for failing to set and apply
certain standards for greenhouse gas emissions from oil refineries .62 More
specifically, the court held that-even though the conservation groups
provided evidence that their members suffered injury in fact from the failure
to control emissions-the groups did not establish the causality and
redressability elements required for standing.63 In distinguishing Bellon
from EPA, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff's causation chain was
too attenuated to satisfy the second prong of the test and the parties were not
a sovereign state entitled to the more relaxed standard for evaluating
standing set forth in EPA.' The court noted that in the present case,
greenhouse gas emissions from five oil refineries in Washington made up

56 See id. at 341-44 ("we find that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged future injury. Given the

current injury alleged by the States, and the future injuries alleged by all Plaintiffs, we hold that
Plaintiffs have alleged injury-in-fact.").
" See id. at 347 ("Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that their current and future injuries are
'fairly traceable' to Defendants' conduct .... It is sufficient that they allege that Defendants'
emissions contribute to their injuries.").
58 See id. at 348-49 (emphasizing satisfaction of redressability and rejecting defendants'
arguments).
" See id. at 349 ("In conclusion, we hold that all Plaintiffs have standing to maintain their
actions.").
60 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d. at 348 ("In other words, that courts could provide some
measure of relief would suffice to show redressability, and the proposed remedy need not address
or prevent all harm from a variety of other sources.").
61 See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing
individuals' burden of proof to show standing).
62 See id. at 1136 (referencing court's holding on Article I standing).
63 See id. at 1141, 1146 (emphasizing court's narrow holding on causality and redressability).
64 See id. at 1142-43, 1145 (distinguishing Massachusetts from case at bar).
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5.9% of emissions in the state .65However, the plaintiffs did not provide any
evidence that placed that statistic in perspective to assess whether the
refineries made a meaningful contribution to global greenhouse gas levels .66
The court's explanation for why the plaintiffs failed the redressability
requirement rested on many of the same reasons enumerated in the court's
causation analysis .67
In City of New York and County of San Mateo, federal district court
judges held that the Clean Air Act still displaced the plaintiffs' claims - even
though the plaintiffs claimed they were suing energy producers for
discrediting scientific research that established greenhouse gas emissions
contributed to climate change .68 In County of San Mateo, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs' framing of their arguments was ultimately a
distinction without a difference because their claims still rested on receiving
damages for rising sea levels and soil erosion. 69 Applying AEP and Kivalina
to County of San Mateo, the court concluded that the former did not confine
their holdings about displacement of federal common law to particular
sources of emissions; rather, the court stated that any claim based on the
interstate effect of domestic greenhouse gas emissions was displaced by the
Clean Air Act.7" As a result, the court rejected the city's argument that its
climate change-related injuries were from the production and sale of fossil
fuels, and instead concluded that the city's injuries resulted from an
attenuated chain of events involving the combustion and sale of fossil fuels .71
Likewise, in City ofNew York, the court concluded that federal common law
was not only displaced when damages for domestic emissions were at issue,

65 See id. at 1145-46 (suggesting defendant's small contribution to plaintiff's injuries negates
causation link).
66 See Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1146 ("While this may be a significant portion of state emissions,
Plaintiffs do not provide any evidence that places this statistic in national or global perspective to
assess whether the refineries' emissions are a 'meaningful contribution' to global GHG levels.").
67 See id. at 1146-47 (presenting similarities in court's causation and redressability analysis).
68 See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 472-75 (suggesting plaintiffs subjective purpose
for suing is not material to displacement); County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (holding
subjective purpose of suit has no bearing on displacement).
69 See County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937 ("Simply put, these cases should not have
been removed to federal court on the basis of federal common law that no longer exists.").
70 See id. at 937 (stating court's holding); see also City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 47275 (noting that Clean Air Act displaces all claims based on injuries from climate change); California
v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (rejecting
public nuisance claim under state law for global warming tort actions).
71 See County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (rejecting county's argument that fossil
fuels caused its climate change related injuries).
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energy producers' contributions to climate change
but so were claims against
7. 2
levels
sea
rising
and
In contrast to City of New York and County of San Mateo, the court
in Californiainitially issued a preliminary order that the plaintiffs' claims
were not displaced by federal law." The plaintiff s believed the defendants
were liable because they engaged in large scale efforts to discredit scientific
research on global warming while also producing fossil fuels.14 The

plaintiffs advanced three arguments for rejecting federal jurisdiction-each
of which the court initially rejected."

First, the plaintiffs argued that

extending federal common law to the current dispute would over extend the
scope of federal nuisance law .76 The court responded that the transboundary
effects of global warming required a federal uniform solution; thus, federal
common law displaced the plaintiffs state law claims. 77 Second, the
plaintiffs argued that the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law
claims .78 The court argued that California was distinct from AEP and
Kivalina because the plaintiffs' claims centered around the defendant's

course of action to produce and sell fossil fuels while simultaneously

72

See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 472-74 ("[T]he Clean Air Act displaces claims

arising from damages caused by domestic greenhouse gas emissions because Congress has
expressly delegated these issues to the EPA.").
73 See California,2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at * 13-14 ("Here, the Clean Air Act does not
provide a sufficient legislative solution to the nuisance alleged to warrant a conclusion that this
legislation has occupied the field to the exclusion of federal common law."). Here, the plaintiffs
actually wanted to stay in state court, so they argued against federal jurisdiction. Id. at *3.But see
City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 472-74 (reasoning claims are displaced by Clean Air Act
because plaintiff s injuries arose from greenhouse gases); County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at
937 (holding Clean Air Act displaces claims for injunctive relief and damages for climate change
injuries).
74 See California,2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at *4 ("[P]laintiffs' state law nuisance claims
are premised on the theory that-despite long-knowing that their products posed severe risks to the
global climate-defendants produced fossil fuels while simultaneously engaging in large scale
advertising and public relations campaigns to discredit scientific research on global warming, to
downplay the risks of global warming, and to portray fossil fuels as environmentally responsible
and essential to human well-being.").
75 See id. at * 10 (noting that plaintiff advanced three different arguments for rejecting federal
jurisdiction). Defendants likely removed the case to federal court because they recognized that
there is a higher bar for satisfying Article LI standing in federal court, as opposed to state court.
Goldberg, supra note 2. Consequently, the plaintiffs argued for a denial of the removal and for the
case to remain in state court. California,2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at *14.
76 See California,2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at *10-11 ("Extending federal common law
to the current dispute, plaintiffs caution, would extend the scope of federal nuisance law well
beyond its original justification.").
77 See id. (arguing that "the transboundary problem of global warming raises exactly the sort
of federal interests that necessitate a uniform solution.").
78 See id. at * 11-12 (presenting plaintiff's second argument surrounding Clean Air Act).
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deceiving the public about the consequences of global warming . Third, the
plaintiffs argued that the well-pleaded complaint rule barred the motion. 80
The court held that the plaintiffs' claims depended on a global complex of
cause and effect involving all nations and the relationships between the
United States and other nations, and as a result, a uniform rule was required.8'1
In a complete reversal, the California court drastically changed
course in its final ruling and held that the plaintiffs' producer sale and
deception theories were still defeated by both displacement and the political
question doctrine-like in City of New York and County of San Mateo.82
First, the Clean Air Act preempted the plaintiff's claims because the harm
that the plaintiffs alleged was still caused by fossil fuel emissions, and not
just the extraction or sale of fossil fuels.8 3 Second, the portion of the
plaintiffs' complaint that sought damages for the energy producers' conduct
and emissions contributing to the global adverse effects of climate change,
while not addressed by the AEP or Kivalina decisions, was nonetheless
precluded by the need for judicial deference to other branches of government
to resolve transnational problems like climate change.84
While the Supreme Court has held that "the control of interstate
pollution is primarily a matter of federal law," there is still some uncertainty
as to whether plaintiffs' state law claims survive federal displacement
analysis. 85 In Texas Industries Inc. v. RadcliffMaterials,Inc., the Supreme
Court held that where "the interstate .. . nature of the controversy makes it
inappropriate for state law to control ... our federal system does not permit

79 See id. at *12-14 (presenting court's attempt to distinguish case at bar from AEP and
Kivalina).
'0 See id. at *14 ("[T]he well-pleaded complaint rule does not bar removal of these actions.").
81 See California,2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at *14-15 (discussing plaintiff's claims are

governed by federal common law).
82 See City of Oakland v. BP PL.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (comparing
court's final ruling from preliminary ruling).
83 See id. ("The February 27 order concluded that because plaintiffs' nuisance claims centered
on defendants' placement of fossil fuels into the flow of international commerce, and because
foreign emissions are out of the EPA and Clean Air Act's reach, the Clean Air Act did not
necessarily displace plaintiffs' federal common law claims.").
84 See id. ("Nevertheless, these claims are foreclosed by the need for federal courts to defer to
the legislative and executive branches when it comes to such international problems, as now
explained.").
85 See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellete, 479 U.S. 481,492 (1987) (quoting Supreme Court's position
on pollution and federal displacement analysis); see also City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F.
Supp. 3d 466, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (stating federal common law governs claims regarding
pollution); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972) (demonstrating Congress's role
in creating federal remedies for pollution).
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the controversy to be resolved under state law." 86 As a result, when plaintiffs
bring climate suits for damages caused by the transboundary effects of
greenhouse gas emissions indirectly caused by energy producers, some
courts stated that their claims arise under federal law and require a uniform
standard of decision.87 On the other hand, other courts indicated that state
law claims may survive when plaintiff's federal common law claims have
been displaced by the Clean Air Act. 88 Courts are split on whether local
government claims for relief are displaced and also preempted by federal
This uncertainty means that there may be room for plaintiffs to bring
law .89
their nuisance claims in state court and not be preempted by federal law.9°
As such, it is necessary that the federal judiciary clarify whether state law
nuisance claims are preempted by the Clean Air Act.91
Until recently, courts were split as to whether the political question
doctrine would make these climate cases nonjusticiable. 92 In American
86 See Texas Industries Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,641 (1981) (stating that
federal law controls resolution of interstate controversies).
87 See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 472 (reiterating that climate change requires
uniform solution). However, departure from judicial abstention in creating a uniform climate
change solution would interfere with separation of powers and foreign policy. Id.; California v. BP
P.L.C., No. C 17-06011,2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (stating Supreme
Court's holding that pollution is under federal common law).
88 See County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(recognizing that some state law claims may survive federal preemption under certain
circumstances).
89 See id. (highlighting uncertainty of state law claim's survival).
90 See Ferrey, supra note 6, at 277 (suggesting state courts may remain viable option for
plaintiffs seeking relief from climate injuries).
91 See id. (stating that in AEP, Court "never answered the viability of state rather than federal
nuisance law."). While the Supreme Court never decided the viability of whether state nuisance
law remained a viable claim, the Third Circuit held that similar common law claims were not
preempted. Id.
92 See City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466,476 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("Thus, to
the extent that the City seeks to hold Defendants liable for damages stemming from foreign
greenhouse gas emissions, the City's claims are barred by the presumption against extraterritoriality
and the need for judicial caution in the face of 'serious foreign policy consequences."'); but see
California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011,2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
("If ever a problem cried out for a uniform and comprehensive solution, it is the geophysical
problem described by the complaints ... the extent of any judicial relief should be uniform across
the nation."); see also Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and the Public Law Model of Torts:
ReinvigoratingJudicialRestraint Doctrines, 62 S.C.L. REV. 201, 250-56 (2010) (discussing why
climate cases would be barred by Baker factors under political question doctrine). Judicial rulings
on climate change would contradict President Trump's decision to increase domestic energy
production and withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. See President Donald J. Trump is
UnleashingAmerican Energy Dominance, WHITEHOUSE (May 14, 2019), https://www.whitehouse
.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-unleashing-american-energy-dominance/
(describing President Trump's plan to increase energy
[https://perma.cc/3CEB-E544]
independence).
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Electric Power Co., the Second Circuit held that there was no textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a specific branch of
government.93 The court reasoned that there was nothing in the Constitution
that granted any one branch of government the power to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions; therefore, the court could rule on whether the EPA could be
compelled to set emissions standards for automobiles.94 In addressing the
second Baker factor, the Second Circuit held that there was no lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the case.95
The court reasoned that the defendant's arguments were undermined by the
fact that federal courts successfully ruled on complex common law public
nuisance cases for over a century, such as public nuisance cases between
states.96 The court pointed to Missouri v. Illinois97 ("Missouri /"), a case
where Missouri sought to prevent Illinois from discharging sewage into a
channel that emptied into the Mississippi River-which likely would have
made a large stretch of the river unusable for humans. 98 In Missouri v.
Illinois9 9 ("Missouri Ir'), the Court carefully weighed the scientific and
expert evidence offered and concluded that Missouri had not established
injury or causation. °° The Second Circuit similarly pointed to the case of
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., where the Supreme Court set definitive
emissions limits, imposed monitoring requirements, and divided costs
between the defendants after Georgia alleged that poisonous emissions from
Tennessee Copper Company plants were destroying land in Georgia.' 0'
Moreover, the Second Circuit reasoned that federal courts have long been

93 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2009)
(acknowledging Second Circuit's AEP holding).
94 See id. ("We find no textual commitment in the Constitution that grants the Executive or
Legislative branches responsibility to resolve issues concerning carbon dioxide emissions or other
forms of alleged nuisance.").
95 See id. at 326 (articulating Second Circuit's analysis of second Baker factor as applied to
defendant's claims).
96 See id. (outlining history of federal court decisions adjudicating public nuisance cases).
" 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
98 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 326 (highlighting Missouri v. Illinois adjudication);
see also Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208,212-13 (1901) (Missouri I) ("[T]he Sanitary District of
Chicago, as aforesaid, has been discharging its sewage matter and filth in the Chicago river.").
99 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
100 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 326-27 (discussing Missouri H holding).
101 See id. at 327 (using Tennessee Copper Co. as another example); see also Georgia v.

Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238-39 (1907) (noting Supreme Court granted injunctive
relief to Georgia). The Court explained that it was "satisfied, by a preponderance of evidence, that
the sulphurous fumes cause and threaten damage on so considerable a scale to the forests and
vegetable life, if not to health, within the plaintiff state, as to make out a case within the
requirements of [Missouri II]." Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 238-39.
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able to assess "complex scientific evidence in cases where the cause of action

' 2
was based [...] on the federal common law or [...] a statute.'

In addressing the third Baker factor, the court held that it was not
impossible to decide the case without an initial policy determination based
clearly for nonjudicial discretion.103 The court reasoned that just because the
Clean Air Act did not provide the plaintiffs with their sought remedy did not
mean plaintiffs would have to wait for the Legislative and Executive
1°4
Branches to craft a comprehensive solution to global warming. Regarding
the fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker factors, the court reasoned that allowing this
litigation absent an unified policy by the federal government did not
demonstrate any lack of respect for the other branches of government,
contravene a relevant political decision already made, or result in multiple
different policies that would embarrass the nation.0 5 The City of New York
and City of Oakland cases challenged the Second Circuit's analysis of the
political question doctrine in climate litigation by holding that political
question doctrine bars federal courts from adjudicating claims seeking
injunctive and monetary relief for damages caused by both greenhouse gas
emitters and producers."6

M. ANALYSIS
The lower courts appropriately decided that the political question
17
doctrine barred them from adjudicating the plaintiffs' claims on the merits.
0
In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, the Supreme Court held that where judicial
action may have significant foreign relations implications, courts should be
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 329 (quoting Second Circuit's reasoning).
103 See id. at 330 (presenting court's analysis of third Baker factor).
104 See id. at 331 ("Plaintiffs here may seek their remedies under the federal common law.
They need not await an 'initial policy determination' in order to proceed on this federal common
law of nuisance claim, as such claims have been adjudicated in federal courts for over a century.").
105 See id. at 332 (detailing Second Circuit's holding).
106 See City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466,476 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("To litigate
102

such an action for injuries from foreign greenhouse gas emissions in federal court would severely
infringe upon the foreign-policy decisions that are squarely within the purview of the political
branches of the U.S. Government."); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 102429 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ("[T]he worldwide problem of global warming should be determined by our
political branches, not by our judiciary.").
107 See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 467 (concluding that litigating these actions for
injuries would conflict with separation of powers); City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1029
(holding that regulation of global warming be left to political branches not judiciary); County of
San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934,937 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (finding removal to federal
court unwarranted where federal common law does not exist).
"' 138 S.Ct. 1386 (2018).
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particularly wary of infringing upon the discretion of the legislative and
executive branches in managing foreign affairs.109 For both City ofNew York
and City of Oakland, the courts applied Jesner in finding that when cities
seek to hold foreign oil and gas companies liable for greenhouse gas
emissions, their claims are barred by the need for judicial caution in the face
of serious foreign policy consequences that may result from adjudicating
such claims. 10 In City of Oakland,the court reasoned that litigating an action
for domestic injuries from foreign greenhouse gas emissions in federal court
would implicate the interests of foreign and domestic governments, and
arbitrarily see a single judge or jury in California "impose an abatement
fund" upon these international companies as a result of the effects of their
transnational operations."'
Similarly, in City of New York, the court stated that such conduct
would "severely infringe upon the foreign-policy decisions that are squarely
within the purview of the political branches." 1' 12 In AEP, the Second Circuit
found that a decision by a federal court concerning common law nuisance
brought by domestic plaintiffs against domestic powerplants for their
emissions did not create a national or international emissions policy.'13 In
both City of New York and City of Oakland, the courts distinguished AEP
from the cities' claims, which were against both foreign and domestic oil

109 See Jesner, 138

S.Ct.

at 1399-1419 (warning courts should be cautious when cases have

significant foreign relations implications). See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 569
U.S. 108, 109-17 (2013) (discussing foreign relation implications). Kiobel warned that where a
claim "reaches conduct within the territory of another sovereign," concerns of "unwarranted
judicial interference" in foreign policy "are all the more pressing." Id. at 116-17; City of Oakland,
325 F. Supp. 3d at 1026 (emphasizing judicial deference to political branches of government in
matters implicating foreign relations).
110 See Jesner, 138 S.Ct. at 1407 (reiterating courts should be careful when certain cases may
have significant foreign policy implications); see also City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 47576 ("To litigate such an action for injuries from foreign greenhouse gas emissions in federal court
would severely infringe upon the foreign-policy decisions that are squarely within the purview of
the political branches of the U.S. Government. Accordingly, the Court will exercise appropriate
caution and decline to recognize such a cause of action."); City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at
1025-29 (emphasizing need for "great caution" where relief would equate to governing foreign
energy policy).
11 See City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1026 (explaining balancing pros and cons of fossil
fuel consumption should be left to other branches). Allowing nuisance suits to be adjudicated in
different United States district courts would interfere with the determinations of other government
branches on how the United States should interact with the energy industry. Id.
112 See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (announcing decision).
113 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309,325 (2d Cir. 2009) ("A decision by
a single federal court concerning a common law of nuisance cause of action, brought by domestic
plaintiffs against domestic companies for domestic conduct, does not establish a national or
international emissions policy (assuming that emissions caps are even put into place).").
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14
companies - all of whom produce and sell fossil fuels globally. The courts
implied that federal judiciary opinions holding international oil companies
accountable for greenhouse gas emissions would have enormous foreign
policy consequences, and consequently, that judicial deference was
necessary under the political question doctrine 15 Therefore, the courts in
City of New York and City of Oakland correctly decided that federal courts
ruling on cases about domestic injuries from foreign greenhouse gas
emissions made those cases nonjusticiable, political questions given the
6
significant foreign policy implications by such rulings.
Even in the absence of Jesner, the political question doctrine still
bars these climate cases as adjudication would be inextricable from several
Baker factors117 While the Constitution does not expressly delegate
authority for addressing climate change to either the Legislative or Executive
Branches, it would likely disrespect those governmental branches who have
either taken the lead or failed to address the problem. 1 8 Additionally,
judicial action would contravene the Executive's decision to withdraw from
the Paris Agreement, and potentially embarrass the U.S. if a court awarded
damages for greenhouse gas emissions while the executive branch
simultaneously tried to promote domestic energy production '19 President
Trump has made increasing domestic energy production a main priority for
his administration. 120 As a result, if a court were to order one of those
domestic producers to pay damages for the effects of greenhouse gas
emissions linked to the sale of its fossil fuels, such an order would directly
interfere with and contradict the president's initiatives, demonstrate a

114 See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (emphasizing AEP claim against foreign
companies); City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1024 (acknowledging that in AEP, conduct and
emissions arose outside United States).
"' See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475-76 (reiterating importance of separation of
powers in regard to global warming related claims by states); City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at
1025-29 (discussing "sound reasons" why regulation of global warming is best left to political
branches).
116 See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018) (discussing political question
doctrine and potential for diplomatic disruptions); City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475-76
(discussing separation of powers); City of Oakland,325 F. Supp. 3d at 1025-27 (balancing policy
concerns of harmful effects of greenhouse gas emissions with national security priorities).
117 See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407 (noting judicial difficulty in asserting jurisdiction over
foreign corporate defendants); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ("The nonjusticiability of
a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.").
118 See Gifford, supra note 92 (analyzing why climate cases would be barred by Baker factors
under political question doctrine).
"9 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-11 (discussing implications of judicial involvement in matters
delegated to Congress and executive).
120 See PresidentDonaldJ. Trump is UnleashingAmerican Energy Dominance, supra note 92
(describing President Trump's plan to increase energy independence).
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profound disrespect towards the Executive Branch, and embarrass the
nation.

121

The courts also correctly applied AEP and Kivalina in deciding that
the CAA displaced the plaintiffs' claims.1 22 In the wake of the AEP and
Kivalina decisions, a new wave of climate suits permeated the federal
judiciary seeking relief for damages caused by climate change-not based
on the defendants emissions of greenhouse gases-but their knowledge of
climate change's adverse effects and their active efforts to discredit the
science establishing combustion of fossil fuels as a significant contributor to
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. 123 The lower courts were
initially split on whether these new claims avoided AEP's displacement
analysis .124
Until recently, the lower courts were split on whether complaints
based on energy producers' knowledge of the adverse effects of climate
change and their efforts to discredit existing scientific research are displaced
by existing jurisprudence. 125 The courts in City of New York, City of
Oakland,and County of San Mateo held that the Clean Air Act displaced the
plaintiffs' claims even though they were not suing greenhouse gas

121

See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-17 (cautioning against judicial intrusion and its domestic and

foreign implications).
122 See City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 472-73 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(referencing AEP and Kivalina holdings); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017,
1024-25 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (addressing EPA's authority to set emission standards); County of San
Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934,937 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (stating that AEP and Kivalina
did not confine holdings on displacement to particular emission sources); see also Native Vill. of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (characterizing federal common
law displaced where legislative action has been taken); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582
F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009) (describing displacement claims).
123 See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 468 ("Climate science clearly demonstrates that
burning of fossil fuels is primary cause of climate change."); County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp.
3d at 937 (interpreting AEP and Kivalina to warrant displacement in substantially similar
circumstances); California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at *5-6
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (stating that plaintiff's claims were governed by federal common law).
124 See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 472 (holding plaintiffs claims were displaced);
City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1024 (declining to reach novel displacement issue where
judicial action would implicate political question doctrine); County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d
at 937 (holding removal based on federal common law was not warranted); California,2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 32990, at * 12-15 (concluding that there was no displacement of plaintiffs' claims
under circumstances).
125 See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 472-74 (holding plaintiffs' claims were displaced
by CAA); County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (rejecting court's analysis in California
and holding that plaintiffs' claims were displaced); California,2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32990, at
* 12-15 (holding that plaintiffs' novel claims were not displaced under CAA).
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emitters. 26 These courts reasoned that Kivalina, in addition to displacing
plaintiffs' claims against domestic greenhouse gas emitters, plaintiffs' also
displaced federal common law claims against energy producers'
contributions to manifestations of climate change, such as rising sea levels,
were also displaced.127 While the local governments' new approach to seek
relief for greenhouse gas emissions in federal court was innovative, the lower
courts correctly relied upon the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
jurisprudence in holding that-regardless of whether a plaintiff sought
damages for greenhouse gas emissions directly or indirectly -such claims
are nonetheless displaced by the Clean Air Act. 28 In other words, when
plaintiffs bring nuisance and trespass claims against defendants for domestic
greenhouse gas emissions, the Clean Air Act displaces those federal common
law claims under AEP and Kivalina- even though the plaintiffs might not
explicitly state that they are seeking liability for direct emissions of carbon

dioxide. 129 Since the Clean Air Act displaces claims seeking relief for the
effects of greenhouse emissions, plaintiffs should instead dedicate their

energy and resources to pursuing climate suits based on nuisance claims in
state court rather than federal court. 30

See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 472-74 (noting plaintiff seeks damages for
combustion of defendant's fossil fuels); City of Oakland,325 F. Supp. 3d at 1026 ("[P]laintiffs seek
to impose liability ... for.., production and sale of fossil fuels worldwide."); County of San
Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937 ("[AEP] did not confine its holding about the displacement of federal
common law to particular sources of emissions.").
127 See County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (discussing extent of Supreme Court's
holding in AEP); see also City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 472-74 (reasoning that Clean Air
Act displaces City's claims "seeking damages for past and future domestic greenhouse gas
emissions brought under federal common law.").
128 See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 472-74 ("[T]he Supreme Court has instructed that
the type of remedy asserted is not relevant to ... the doctrine of displacement.") (quoting Native
Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2012)); City of Oakland,325
F. Supp. 3d at 1025-29 ("[Displacement] claims are foreclosed by the need for federal courts to
defer to the legislative and executive branches when it comes to such international problems."); see
also County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937 ("Kivalina stands for the proposition that federal
common law is not just displaced when it comes to claims against domestic sources of emissions
but also when it comes to claims against energy producers' contributions to global warming and
rising sea levels."). In Kivalina, the Ninth Circuit noted that "the Supreme Court has instructed
that the type of remedy asserted is not relevant to the applicability of the doctrine of
displacement ... if a cause of action is displaced, displacement is extended to all remedies."
Kivalina, 696 F.3d. at 857.
129 See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 472-76 (highlighting "transboundary"
complexities related to carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases).
130 See County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937-38 (clarifying that Clean Air Act
preserves state causes of action); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c) (2018) (allowing state action to be
exempt from preemption).
126
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In City of New York and City of Oakland, the court found that the
plaintiffs' claims were displaced by the Clean Air Act and presented nonjusticiable political questions.'
In County of San Mateo, the court also
found that the plaintiffs' claims could not be adjudicated by the court because
they presented non-justiciable political questions. 3 2 Consequently, the
lower courts did not reach the issue of Article III standing. 13 3 If any of the
courts evaluated prudential standing, they would have likely found that the
plaintiffs in California,New York, and San Mateo had Article III standing to
bring their claims.134 The plaintiffs demonstrated injury in fact because they
face both current and future injuries stemming from the energy producer
actions, such as sea level rise.' 35 The plaintiffs also satisfied the causation
requirement because they satisfactorily alleged that the defendant's public
deception campaign and the sale of fossil fuels contributed to their injuries. 136
Finally, the plaintiffs satisfied the redressability requirement because they
alleged that ordering energy producers to pay for climate resiliency projects
would help alleviate the burden on local governments to implement such
projects.

137

131 See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018) ("[T]he political branches, not
the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns.");
City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475 (referencing Jesner holding and court rationale); City of
Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1025-29 (referencing Jesner holding and rationale to conclude that
Congress or diplomacy must address global warming).
132 See County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937-38 (addressing state law claims were
superseded by federal common law "but ... such state law claims survive depend[ing] on whether
they are preempted by [a] federal statute.").
133 See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410,420 (2011) (quoting Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)) ("There is no federal general common law.").
134 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 341-49 (2d Cir. 2009) (detailing
states' claims presented attributable injuries from greenhouse gases).
135 See id. at 341-42 (stating rising sea levels resulting of global warming will cause more
frequent and severe flooding).
136 See id. at 347 (reviewing defendant's argument that many others contribute to global
warming).

Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that their current and future injuries are "fairly
traceable" to Defendants' conduct. For purposes of Article I standing they are not
required to pinpoint which specific harms of the many injuries they assert are caused by
particular Defendants, nor are they required to show that Defendants' emissions alone
cause their injuries. It is sufficient that they allege that Defendants' emissions contribute
to their injuries.
Id.
131 See id. at 348-49 (highlighting that courts' ability to provide some measure of relief
satisfies redressability requirement). This was an appropriate remedy because the defendants were
found to be responsible for a considerable amount of the greenhouse gas emissions that caused the
plaintiffs harm. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION

While this new wave of lower court rulings is sure to disappoint
many climate advocates and state and local governments seeking relief for
the adverse effects of climate change, it is important to note that, under AEP,
the Clean Air Act allows any individual to sue the EPA in federal court not
only for failing to enforce their emissions limits, but also for failing to set
emissions limits for particular pollutants. Thus, all is not completely lost for
plaintiffs in federal court. Court holdings from the new wave of climate
litigation cases have merely eliminated the ability of plaintiffs to sue
greenhouse gas producers and emitters in federal court. These cases have
not affected a plaintiff's right to sue the EPA and demand it set and enforce
emissions standards. Consequently, state and local governments seeking
judicial relief for the effects of climate change should focus their time and
energy in the state court system.
Thomas Stirrat

